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ABSTRACT. We use a recently uncovered decoupling of Isaacs PDE’s of some mixed closed loop
Nash equilibria to give a rather complete analysis of the classical problem of conflict over parental
care in behavioural ecology, for a more general set up than had been considered heretofore.
RÉSUMÉ. On utilise un découplage récemment mis en évidence des équations d’Isaacs d’un jeu
différentiel pour des stratégies mixtes singulières particulières pour donner une analyse assez com-
lète d’un problème classique en écologie comportementale concernant le conflit à propos des soins
parentaux.
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1. Introduction
A pair of parents breeding offspring encounters a classical conflict: while both parents,
as gene reproducers, have a stake at brining the young to adulthood in order to spread their
genes, each bears a cost in terms of fitness by caring for the young, be it in terms of lost
opportunities to spread its genes elsewhere, or of lost time to gather energy for itself.
Building on the initial work [13], this conflict has been the object of much investigations.
See [5, 14]. Dynamical models have been considered, e.g. in [17, 9, 12].
As compared to these earlier works, we shall consider both a given level of welfare to
reach for the offspring and a maximum time to reach it: the end of the breeding season.
Also, we let that welfare decrease in the absence of parental care, down to death of the
young if left careless. Finally, we allow male and female to be asymmetric on two counts:
first in terms of “cost” of breeding their offspring. One of the two, for instance, might be
more prone to predation, either because it is more visible, or less apt to defend its life.
Second, we let them differ in their efficiency at gathering food or otherwise breeding the
child. Finally, we shall investigate the incentive for each to deffect, leaving the nest and
abandoning the offspring.
“Nothing in Biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” 1. In this respect,
Behavioral Ecology interprets animal behavior from an evolutionary point of view, i.e., in
terms of being a stable outcome of the Natural Selection process. As this is genetic infor-
mation which is conserved through Selection, animal behavior is expected to be shaped in
such a way that it is particularly efficient at transmitting individual’s genetic inheritance
throughout generations [18]. This provides the standard paradygm of behavioral ecology:
i.e. that analysis of animal —or for that matter plant— behavior in terms of decision
theory and optimality may have some relevance and say something about their actual
behavior, without assuming any intelligent will of the animals. This is in line with the
famous “selfish gene” theory of R. Dawkins [6], and more specifically Maynard-Smith’s
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) [19, 18]
Our investigation in terms of the Nash equilibrium of a differential game, and thus a
candidate ESS, leads to dynamic state feedback mixed strategies, a novel feature in that
literature. The literature on differential games bears a striking difference with that on
classical game theory in that, while the latter is mainly concerned with mixed strategies
—up to the point that ordinary decisions have to be called pure strategies to recall that they
are not mixed—, mixed strategies have had little impact on differential games research.
On the one hand, differential games have been mainly concerned with state feedback or
non anticipative strategies, and the concept of mixed state feedback, or, for that matter
mixed nonanticipative strategy, is surely not simple. On the other hand, most of that
literature has considered continous decision sets, as opposed to finite, thus allowing for
enough convexity or concavity without relying on mixed strategies. Here we have a game
with finite decision sets at each instant of time, although its dynamic nature makes the
decision sets infinite, and of course the strategies sets even more so.
However, we recently showed ([12]) that in the case of a two-player (non-zero-sum)
game where each player has only two possible controls —the framework of this article—,
not only do mixed strategies come up as a natural concept, but moreover they lead to a
1. Theodosius Dobzhansky, geneticist, 1900–1975.
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concept of bi-singular trajectory fields which seems to have no counterpart in control the-
ory. And moreover, the striking fact is hat the pair of Isaacs partial differential equations
of Nash equilibria uncouples, allowing for a simple solution i terms of characteristics.
Looking into older literature, this concept should have been uncovered in the late 60’s
or early 70’s. We are surprised —and a bit suspicious— that we did not find any mention
of it. The present example shows its effectiveness. At least one other instance is known
by now, much more complicated however. See [1].
2. The parental care game
2.1. Game description
Two animals, 1 and 2, have jointly given birth to an offspring. Let x ∈ R be the
weight increase of the young. At initial time, x = 0. The offspring is adult and viable
when x = 1. But this must happen during the year it was born, say at or before time T .
Let ui = 1 if parent i takes care full time of the young, u i = 0 if it defects. In the “pure”
dynamics x˙ is given as follows:
u1\u2 0 1
0 −δ α2
1 α1 γ
The coefficients αi, γ and δ are all assumed positive, with γ > α1 > α2. We let β =
γ − α1 − α2 be the synergy coefficient.
Allowing for “mixed strategies” or partial efforts u i ∈ [0, 1] leads to
x˙ = a1u1 + a2u2 + cu1u2 − δ [1]
ai = αi + δ , c = γ − α1 − α2 − δ.
We allow both parents to behave in closed loop, i.e. use controls of the form u i =
φi(t, x). We shall encounter only constant controls, so that existence of solutions to our
dynamic equations is not an issue.
The game ends at τ = min{t | x(t) = 1 , T }. The reward of the parents are
M(x(τ)) = 1 or 0 according to whether the young has achieved viability or not, —i.e.
M(1) = 1, M(x) = 0 ∀x < 1—, decreased by the cost of caring, say
Ji(u1(·), u2(·)) = M(x(τ)) − εi
∫ τ
0
ui(t) dt .
2.2. Pure equilibria
2.2.1. Constant controls
We notice the following simple facts:
Lemma 1
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1) Any effort that does not lead to x(τ) = 1 is dominated by 0.
2) A parent who cares alone should use the pure strategy u i = 1.
3) The best response to ui = 1 is never uj = 1 unless γT = 1.
Proof
1) If M(x(τ)) = 0, the payoff to each parent is negative, or 0 for whichever has
used ui = 0.
2) If a parent cares alone, to reach x(τ) = 1, it needs to achieve∫ τ
0
(aiu(t)− δ) dt = 1 , =⇒ ai
∫ τ
0
ui(t) dt = 1 + δτ .
Hence its reward is Ji = 1− (εi/ai)(1+ δτ) which is decreasing with τ . Hence it should
strive to minimize τ .
3) Against uj = 1, a constant response ui yields τ = 1/[(γ − αj)ui + αj ] which
is decreasing with ui, as is Ji = 1 − εiτui. Hence if τ < T , a ui < 1 still leads to
termination before T and a higher reward.
This simple fact suffices to allow us to investigate pure Nash equilibria. Consider
the game space in the (t, x) plane. Draw the lines x = 1 − αi(T − t), called Li, and
x = 1− γ(T − t) called Lγ , as in figure 1. (We carry the discussion below for x(0) = 0,
and with respect to the position of 0 on the time axis. This could easily be extended to an
arbitary initial pair (t0, x0).)
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Figure 1. The pure Nash equilibria if the ε i are small.
We claim the following
Theorem 1 The following discussion provides all pure Nash equilibria with constant
controls
Discussion To the right of line Lγ , the child cannot be brought to adulthood within the
remaining time. Therefore, the only Nash equilibrium is (0, 0).
Assume α1 > α2. To the right of line L1, no parent can bring the child to adulthood
alone. Therefore, if the other parent plays u j = 0, the optimum is ui = 0, and (0, 0) is
Nash. A joint effort may drive x to 1 before time T , but, according to the lemma, except
on the line Lγ , (1, 1) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. We shall see mixed equilibria in that
region.
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Between lines L1 and L2, the parent 1 can succeed alone. If its reward in so doing is
positive, it is its best response against u2 = 0. And of course u2 = 0 is the best response
to u1 = 1 since it yields a reward of 1 to parent 2. Therefore, (1, 0) is the only Nash
equilibrium if ε1 < α1. Otherwise, the same situation as to the right of L1 prevails.
To the left of line L2, both parents are able to succeed alone. Therefore, if both
εi < αi, there are two asymmetric Nash equilibria, (1, 0) and (0, 1). If any of the ε i > αi,
that parent has no incentive to breed the child alone. Therefore, its best response to 0 is
0. Therefore if one only, say 1, is in that situation, the only Nash equilibrium is (0, 1). If
both are, again (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium, and also (1, 1) provided that ε i < γ.
2.2.2. Synchronous on-off equilibria
If c > 0, Nash equilibria appear, where both parents care or rest simultanesouly. The
following sufficient condition has no claim of optimality. Note that we have used α 1 ≥ α2
to keep the most stringent of symmetric conditions.
Theorem 2 Assume c > 0. Let T0 be a subset of [0, T ] with measure τ0 ≤ 1/εi, i = 1, 2.
Assume that the controls u¯1(t) = u¯2(t) = 1lT0(t) generate a trajectory x¯(t) ending at
x¯(τ) = 1 before time T , and that (1, u¯2) generate a trajectory ending at τ1. Assume
further that over [τ1, τ ], the trajectory x¯(t) lies below the line of slope γ − α2 passing
through its end-point. Then the pair (u¯1, u¯2) is a Nash equilibrum.
Proof Fix u2 = u¯2, and pick an arbitrary u1(·). If the pair (u1(·), u¯2) does not lead to
termination before time T , parent 1 incurs a negative reward, while the condition τ 0 ≤
1/ε1 insures a positive reward for the pair (u¯1, u¯2). Let therefore τ ′ be the termination
time on this new trajectory. Note that, necessarily, τ ′ ≥ τ1. Two cases arise depending on
whether τ ′ is less or more than τ .
If τ ′ < τ , the support of u¯2 may have been curtailed by the early termination. Let T 2
be that curtailed support, and τ2 its measure. Let T1 = [0, τ ′]− T2, and let v1 and w1 be
the integrals of u1(·) respectively over T1 and T2. We have
x(τ ′) = 1 = a1(v1 + w1) + a2τ2 + cw1 − δτ ′ = x¯(τ) = (a1 + a2 + c)τ0 − δτ .
This can be rearranged in
(a1 + c)(v1 + w1 − τ0) = cv1 + a2(τ0 − τ2)− δ(τ − τ ′) . [2]
The hypothesis in the theorem can be written, using γ − α2 = a1 + c,
x¯(τ ′) = (a1 + a2 + c)τ2 − δτ ′ ≤ (a1 + a2 + c)τ0 − δτ − (a1 + c)(τ − τ ′) ,
which can be rearranged into
a2(τ0 − τ2)− δ(τ − τ ′) ≥ (a1 + c)[τ − τ ′ − (τ0 − τ2)] .
Combining this with (2), and noting that necessarily, τ0 − τ2 ≤ τ − τ ′, we get
(a1 + c)(v1 + w1 − τ0) ≥ cv1 ≥ 0 .
Since J1(u1(·), u¯2)− J1(u¯1, u¯2) = −ε1(v1 +w1 − τ0), we conclude that J1 has creased
in the change.
Otherwise, if τ ′ ≥ τ , then τ2 = τ0, and (2) directly yields the desired result.
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2.3. Time sharing equilibria
If β < 0, that is γ < α1 + α2, i.e. if no synergy exists between the parents, but to the
contrary a law of diminishing return prevails, another family of Nash equilibria shows up,
where the parents agree to take their turn in caring for the child. Assume that α 1T > 1.
Pick a time τ < T such that α2τ < 1 < α1τ . Let
τ1 =
1− α2τ
α1 − α2 and τ2 =
α1τ − 1
α1− α2 .
This way, τ1 + τ2 = τ < T and α1τ1 + α2τ2 = 1. Choose a partition of [0, τ ] into
two (measurable) sets T1 and T2 of respective Lebesgue measures τ1 and τ2. Choose
u¯i(t) = 1lTi(t), i.e. 1 if t ∈ Ti, 0 elsewhere.
We claim
Theorem 3 If β < 0, and if both εiτi < 1, the pair (u¯1, u¯2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Fix u¯2, and choose an arbitrary u1(·). Let τ ′ be the time when the game ends, T ′2
of measure τ ′2 ≤ τ2 the support of u¯2 in [0, τ ′] —it might be less than τ2 if the game ends
earlier— and T ′1 of measure τ ′1 its complement. Let also v1 and w1 be the integrals of
u1(·) over cT ′1 and T ′2 respectively. Notice that v1 ≤ τ ′1.
If (u1(·), u¯2) do not bring the state to 1 before time T , J1 is negative. Otherwise,
using v1 + w1 =
∫
u1dt,
J1(u1(·), u¯2)− J1(u¯1, u¯2) = −ε1(v1 + w1 − τ1) .
Also, writing the dynamics in terms of the greek parameters, we have that
x(τ ′) = (α1 + δ)v1 + α2τ ′2 + (γ − α2)w1 − δτ ′1 = 1 = α1τ1 + α2τ2 .
Using the second and the fourth terms of this equality, we easily get that
α1(v1 + w1 − τ1) = δ(τ ′1 − v1)− βw1 + α2(τ2 − τ ′2) .
If β < 0, the right hand side is positive, hence the variation in J1 is negative.
Notice that, contrary to the mixed equilibrium of the next paragraph, this is a strict
Nash equilibrium, as the right hand side above can be zero only if u 1 = u¯1.
2.4. Mixed equilibria
2.4.1. Time unconstrained trajectories
We now turn to mixed equilibria, using the theory of section 3 (see also [12]) whereby
each player renders the opponent’s hamiltonian singular. This is therefore an pair of
“dynamically equalizing strategies”. The Isaacs equation is as follows. We let V i(t, x) be
the two Value functions of the players. We write λi(t, x) for their derivative in x. If they
are of class C1, they satisfy
∂Vi(t, x)
∂t
+Hi(λi, φ1, φ2) = 0 , Vi(τ, x) = M(x) , [3]
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with
Hi(λi, u1, u2) = λi(a1u1 + a2u2 + cu1u2 − δ)− εiui .
In these equations, (φ1, φ2) stands for a Nash equilibrium of the 2×2 game whose payoffs
are the Hi.
It is useful to rewrite this as
Hi(λi, u1, u2) = (ui 1− ui )Hi
(
uj
1− uj
)
with
Hi = λi
(
γ − εi αi − εi
αj −δ
)
.
As a result, the Nash point sought is that of the bi-matrix game
u1\u2 1 0
λ2γ − ε2 λ2α1
1 λ1γ − ε1 λ1α1 − ε1
λ2α2 − ε2 −λ2δ
0 λ1α2 −λ1δ
The Nash equilibria of the above bi-matrix game are singular controls in the sense of
control theory. They are
φi =
εj − λjaj
λjc
[4]
We investigate a field of trajectories reaching the boundary x = 1. On such trajectories,
locally, the final time is unconstrained. As the rest of the formulation is time invariant,
the associated Value is stationary, and ∂Vi/∂t = 0. Placing this and (4) in (3) yields
φi =
δ
ai
, [5]
and therefore
x˙ = δ
a1a2 + cδ
a1a2
= δ
α1α2 + γδ
(α1 + δ)(α2 + δ)
. [6]
This slope is necessarily positive and less than γ. However, depending on c, it may be
more or less than αi.
Theorem 4 If
T >
a1a2
δ(a1a2 + cδ)
, and εi <
a1a2 + cδ
aj
,
the mixed strategies (5) are a Nash equilibrium over feedback strategies.
Proof Using (6), the first condition in the theorem insures that τ < T , hence M(x(τ)) =
1, and using this, the second one insures that both parents get a positive reward. (Other-
wise, ui = 0 is better.) If so, the functions
Vi(x) = 1− εiaj
a1a2 + cδ
(1− x)
satisfy equations (3) in the region of the game space covered by the trajectories (6), which
includes the initial sate of interest, x(0) = 0.
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2.4.2. Time constrained trajectories
We investigate now trajectories that end up exactly at time T with x(T ) = 1, such that
both parents get a positive reward. Let u i ∈ [0, 1] be such that
T [a1u1 + a2u2 + cu1u2 − δ] = 1 , T εiui < 1 . [7]
Theorem 5 Under conditions (7) the pair of constant controls (u1, u2) is a Nash equi-
librium over feedback strategies if and only if for i = 1, 2, either ui = 1 and 1 − Tαi ∈
[0, (γ − αi)/εj], or uj ≥ φj as given by (5).
Proof We compare the constant control u i to any ui + vi(t), assuming that the other
parent keeps its control uj constant. Let τ be the final time on the trajectory generated by
these new controls. If τ = T and x(T ) < 1, both parents have a negative payoff. Parent
i looses in so doing. Therefore, the new control can be better only if τ ≤ T , which is
impossible to achieve by player i alone if u i = 1.
Assume thus that ui = 1. Since we also assume x(T ) = 1, this implies uj = ( 1T −
αi)/(γ − αi). This must be nonnegative, and yield 1 − εjTuj > 0, which is what our
condition insures.
Assume now that ui < 1, and let wi =
∫ τ
0 vi(t) dt. We have
τ [a1u1 + a2u2 + cu1u2 − δ] + (ai + cuj)wi = 1 , [8]
We assume that indeed τ ≤ T , thus that wi > 0. (Recall that ai + cuj ≥ 0, even though
c may be negative.) We have also Ji(ui + vi, uj) = 1− εiτui − εiwi , Using (7) and (8)
we find that
Ji(ui + vi, uj)− Ji(ui, uj) = −εiwiT (ajuj − δ) .
Therefore, if ajuj−δ < 0, the open loop control ui+vi(·) improves the reward of player
i, and (u1, u2) was not Nash. Conversely, if ajuj − δ ≥ 0, no open loop control can
improve Ji, and then no feedback strategy can either. (Just apply the above calculation
with ui +vi(t) equal to the control of player i generated by a test closed loop strategy and
uj .) Notice also that if uj = φj , the variation in Ji is identically 0. This is the classical
equalization property of mixed Nash equilibria.
The trajectories generated by these strategies are straight lines through the point t =
T , x = 1. They fill the void between the last bi-singular trajectory and the curve L γ of
Figure 2, and cut into the bi-singular field if a u i = 1 is Nash.
2.5. Biological implications
Let us mention a few biological considerations drawn from this analysis.
We stressed in the introduction that, contrary to earlier literature, we allow for asy-
metrical parents. In that respect, intuitively, if γ > α1 + α2, we may consider this as a
synergetic effect, since both parents acting together do better than the sum of their lone
efforts. But if we consider that the efficiency of a parent is in replacing a decrease rate of
δ by an increase of αi, i.e. ai = αi + δ, and similarily for the pair γ + δ, then the measure
of synergy is rather c. Both play a role in the above results.
We do not claim to have described all Nash equilibria. But they are clearly highly non
unique. More analysis in terms of biological interpretations is needed to sort them out.
We give here a few hints.
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We notice that some regions of the game space have the mixed stratey as their natural
outcome. It is particularily so if T is large and the ε i small enough, so that the pure Nash
equilibria are (1, 0) an (0, 1). Then, the mixed equilibrium appears as the “fair” outcome.
The link with an ESS in a population comprising both males and females remains to be
investigated further.
The peculiarity of the mixed Nash is that each parent does exactly the effort which,
if made alone, keeps x˙ = 0. The interpretation is that this is true on locally time un-
constrained trajectories. Therefore the same reasoning as in [12] holds. The fact that the
available time be, globally, constrained by T is reflected, on the one hand, through the
possible overlap of the bi-singular field of trajectories with the field (0, 0), and on the
other hand, by the existence of a new field of mixed equilibria trajectories, filling the gap
between the bi-singular field and the fastest trajectory to just-in-time completion of the
breeding process.
A last point we want to raise is that of the incentive to defect. It follows from the
threshold εi < ai + cδ/aj that, if c > 0, increasing the efficiency of the partner j
will eventually lead to a choice for i to desert. An apparent paradox. The explanation
we propose is that c > 0 means a large synergetic effect. In that case, a less efficient
mate, having a lower aj , has a larger φj = δ/aj . (The threshold is precisely ai + cφj .)
Thus, under the mixed strategy, it will be more often present in the nest, and through the
synergetic effect, this will compensate and over for its lower efficiency.
Is this a plausible explanation for the paradox of the handicap [10, 22, 21, 15] in
sexual selection whereby a morphological trait which is a clear handicap to the individual
enhances its sex-appeal ? We doubt, since it has been noticed that, as a rule, accross
species, the male takes the less care of the young that the morphological difference is
larger.
3. Uncoupling Isaacs equation
3.1. Background
We deal here with two player differential games with scalar controls, dynamics and
payoff affine in each of the controls (and not necessarily jointly affine). A knowledgeable
situation where this arises, which will provide our example, is a game situation where
each player has only two pure strategies and mixes among them. Thus this is also a result
about mixed strategy Nash equilibria in differential games.
The existing literature on mixed strategies in differential games is rather scarce, and
even more so concerning nonzero-sum games. Most of it concerns open-loop strategies
and existence theorems (see [8, 7]). [16] do consider state feedback mixed strategies,
in the context of zero sum two person differential games, and extend their “alternative”
theorem, which is the equivalent of the existence of the Value.
As a matter of fact, mixed strategies in dynamical problems are closely related to
the concept of relaxed controls, which amount to convexifying the holograph domain (or
“vectorgram” in Isaacs’ parlance). The reader is referred to [8] and the references therein.
Here, we use the Isaacs equation approach. It is known that it leads to a pair of cou-
pled first order partial differential equations, for which no simple characteristics theory
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is available in general nor any existence result. Yet, we exploit the linearity in the con-
trol variables to uncouple these two PDE’s in a fashion very much reminiscent of the
equalization theorem of static games.
3.2. Bilinear differential game
We consider the following two-player nonzero-sum differential game:
x˙ = F (x, u1, u2) , x(0) = ξ , [9]
T = inf{t : x(t) ∈ T } and ∀i ∈ {1, 2} ,
Ji(ξ, u(·), v(·)) =
∫ T
0
i(x(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt + Ki(x(T )) .
where
F (x, u1, u2) = A(x) + B1(x)u1 + B2(x)u2 + D(x)u1u2
i(x, u1, u2) = pi(x) + qi(x)ui + ri(x)uj + si(x)uiuj.
(Here as in future uses, uj means u3−i.)
The vector x ∈ Rn is the state of the system. The controls ui, i = 1, 2 are scalars
belonging to compact intervals Ui ⊂ R, the control functions ui(·) ∈ Ui are measurable
functions from R+ to Ui. The functions F and i satisfy standard regularity and growth
properties that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the generated trajectories and of
the payoffs. Following a standard practice, we do not explicitly include time as an argu-
ment. If needed, this can be done by augmenting the state space with a coordinate which
coincides with time. And this is true of feedback strategies.
We are interested in a Nash equilibrium, in feedback strategies. To handle state feed-
back strategies in a dynamic game context, we extend the set up of [2, 3] to non zero sum
games. We call φi(x), i = 1, 2 state feedback strategies for player one and two respec-
tively, i.e. maps from Rn to Ui, and provided that (9) has a unique solution, we use such
notations as J1(ξ, φ1, u2(·)) to mean the payoff obtained by player one when it uses the
feedback u1(t) = φ1(x(t)) while player two uses u2(t).
Therefore, in keeping with the set up of [3] we shall exhibit a pair of feedback maps
(φ1, φ

2) such that, on the one hand, the differential equation (9) with u = φ 1(x) and
v = φ2(x) has a unique solution (we say that Ji(ξ, φ1, φ2) is well defined) for all ξ, as
well as J1(ξ, u(·), φ2) for all u(·) ∈ U and J2(ξ, φ1, v(·)) for all v(·) ∈ V . On the other
hand, they satisfy the following Nash inequalities: for all ξ,
{ ∀u(·) ∈ U , J1(ξ, u(·), φ2) ≤ J1(ξ, φ1, φ2) =: V1(ξ) ,
∀v(·) ∈ V , J2(ξ, φ1, v(·)) ≤ J2(ξ, φ1, φ2) =: V2(ξ) .
We call Vi the value function of player i.
Each player faces one of the following stationary Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
{ ∀x ∈ T , V1(x) = K1(x) and ∀x /∈ T ,
0 = maxu{〈∇V1(x), F (x, u, φ2(x))〉 + 1(x, u, φ2(x))} ,
{ ∀x ∈ T , V2(x) = K2(x) and ∀x /∈ T ,
0 = maxv{〈∇V2(x), F (x, φ1(x), v)〉 + 2(x, φ1(x), v)} .
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For i = 1, 2, let λi = ∇Vi, Hi = 〈λi, F 〉+i. Write the hamiltonians as Hi(x, λi, ui, uj) =
ρi(x, λi, uj) + σi(x, λ1, uj)ui. Thus uj arises linearly in ρi and σi.
We shall make use of the following conditions, for i = 1, 2, each of which may or
may not be satisfied in any particular problem:
C1.i : 〈λi, A〉+ pi = 0 C2.i : 〈λi, Bi〉+ qi = 0
C3.i : 〈λi, Bj〉+ ri = 0 C4.i : 〈λi, D〉+ si = 0
3.3. A bi-singular solution
3.3.1. Isaacs’equations
We are looking for a solution where both controls are singular, or, in the interpretation
of mixed strategies, where both optimal strategies are mixed.
Therefore, the equalities ρ1 = σ1 = ρ2 = σ2 = 0 should hold. This translates into
ρi = 〈λ1, A〉+ pi + (〈λ1, Bj〉+ r1)uj = 0 ,
σi = 〈λi, Bi〉+ qi + (〈λi, D〉+ si)uj = 0 .
These equations can have a solution only if the following two determinants, for i = 1, 2,
are null :
ζi(x, λi) = (〈λi, A〉+ pi)(〈λi, D〉+ si)
− (〈λi, Bi〉+ qi)(〈λi, Bj〉+ ri) = 0 .
Assume that both conditions C4.i, i = 1, 2, hold. The players may choose φ i (x) =
φˆi(x, λj(x)) according to
φˆj(x, λi) = −〈λi, Bi〉+ qi〈λi, D〉+ si .
Assume to the contrary that, say, C4.1 is violated. Then the equation ζ i = 0 implies that
either C2.i or C3.i is also. If it is C3.i is satisfied, we may choose
φˆj(x, λi) = − 〈λi, A〉+ pi〈λi, Bj〉+ ri .
which, if C4.i is also satisfied, coincides with the previous form. If neither C3.i nor C4.i
hold, there is no bi-singular solution.
Now, the Isaacs equations degenerate into two uncoupled partial differential equations,
for i = 1, 2: { ∀x ∈ T , Vi(x) = Ki(x) ,
∀x /∈ T , ζi(x,∇Vi(x)) = 0 .
Notice that if x is scalar then each candidate adjoint vector λ i is solution of an (at
most) quadratic equation, which may suffce to compute it. (This is the case in our parental
care example, but not in [1].) Otherwise, one may attempt to solve these PDE’s via their
characteristic curves (see below).
Once the candidate adjoint vectors are obtained, one has to verify whether conditions
C3.i or C4.i hold, so that one can calculate a candidate equilibrium feedback strategy. If
so, it remains to check wether these are admissible: lying in U i, and regular enough to get
the existence properties sought for (9). If yes, we have exhibited a Nash equilibrium in
state feedback.
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3.3.2. Characteristic curves
According to the classical theory of characteristic curves of a first order PDE [4],
we may construct two fields of such curves, one for each PDE : x i(s)2 according to the
equations
dxi
ds
= ∇λiζi
dλi
ds
= −∇xζi .
Notice that the characteristic curves are generally not game trajectories.
Let us investigate how these last two differential equations should be initialized. We
assume that the field sought ends transversely on an hpersurface S = {x | S(x) = 0}.
This may be the target set on which Vi(x) = Ki(x) is known, and in that case let
λ+i (x) = ∇Ki(x), or an hypersurface from which an emerging field, constructed back-
ward from the target set, is known, in which the adjoint vectors ∇V i(x) = λ+i (x) have
been computed. In both cases, let ν(x), x ∈ S, be a local normal to S. We know from
differential geometry that necessarily, in the incoming field denoted with the superscript
−,
λ−i (x) = λ
+
i (x) + ki(x)ν(x) .
Placing this back in the equation ζ−i = 0, i = 1, 2, yields a second degree algebraic
equation for each ki. These two equations are still uncoupled. Now, one of these equations
may have no (real) solution. In that case there is no bi-singular field of the form sought.
If both have two real solutions, in our experience, only one pair yielded controls φˆj ,
j = 1, 2, both belonging to their respective control set U j .
3.4. Enforcing bilinearity via mixed strategies
Assume that the players’ controls are u1, u2 ∈ {0, 1}. Let Fu1u2(x) = F (x, u1, u2)
and the dynamics can be written
x˙ = (1− u1)(1 − u2)F00(x) + (1 − u1)u2F01(x)
+ u1(1 − u2)F10(x) + u1u2F11(x) .
In a similar fashion, let iu1u2(x) = i(x, u1, u2);  can thus also be written
i(x, u1, u2)=(1− u2)(1− u1)i00(x) + (1 − u1)u2i01
+ u1(1 − u2)i10 + u1u2i11(x).
We follow [8] and, to some extent, [16], in identifying mixed strategies with relaxed
controls in the tradition of [20]. In a dynamic setting, this can be seen as the limit of a
very high frequency chatter between the two possible controls, provided, though, that it
be specified that the two chatters cannot be synchronized. Then, we let u 1 and u2 ∈ [0, 1]
be the mathematical expectations of u1 and u2 respectively. (Linearity allows us to take
the mathematical expectations on the controls rather than on F and the  i’s.)
Connecting these notations to those of the previous section lets A = F00, B = F10 −
F00, C = F01 − F00 and D = F11 − F10 − F01 + F00. Similarly, we have pi = i00,
qi = i10 − i00, ri = i01 − i00 and si = i11 − i10 − i01 + i00.
2. the subscript i of x denotes a field of characteristics, not a coordinate.
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